






R&D and the Agglomeration of Industries 
 
University of Lüneburg 







ISSN 1860 - 5508 
by 





This paper discusses a model of the New Economic Geography, in which the
seminal core-periphery model of Krugman (1991) is extended by endogenous
research activities. Beyond the common ’anonymous’ consideration of R&D
expenditures within ﬁxed costs, this model introduces vertical product diﬀer-
entiation, which requires services provided by an additional R&D sector. In
the context of international factor mobility, the destabilizing eﬀects of a mobile
scientiﬁc workforce are analyzed. In combination with a welfare analysis and
a consideration of R&D promoting policy instruments and their spatial im-
plications, this paper makes a contribution to the so-called brain drain debate.
Keywords: R&D, New Economic Geography, Vertical Diﬀerentiation
JEL classiﬁcations: F12, F14, F17
¤Jan Kranich, Institute of Economics, D-21 332 Lueneburg, Germany, email: kranich@uni-
lueneburg.de1 Introduction
The Lisbon Strategy, constituted by the European Council in 2000 and revised in
2005, was targeted "to make the European Union (EU) the leading competitive
economy in the world and to achieve full employment by 2010". A central part of
this ambitious objective is to establish a sustainable growth based upon innovation
and a knowledge-based economy. The Lisbon Strategy is closely connected with
the European structural and cohesion policy. Under this directive, the EU provides
overall ¤347 billion for the period 2007–2013 for national and regional development
programmes, from which ¤84 billion will be made available for innovation invest-
ments. The main priorities are assigned to improve the economic performance of
European regions and cities by promoting innovation, research capabilities and en-
trepreneurship with the objective of economic convergence.1 National and regional
programmes accompany the supranational eﬀorts following the key-note that indus-
trial dispersion, as well as spacious growth, can be realized by a competition of
regions.
In their annual progress report, the European Commission draws a positive interim
conclusion about the Lisbon Strategy.2 The economic growth in the EU expected
to rise at 2.9% in 2007, the employment rate of 66% was much closer to the target
of 70%, and the productivity growth reached 1.5% in 2006. As also the report ad-
mits, the progress can only partly be ascribed to the Lisbon Strategy in the face of
the global economic growth and increasing international trade. Furthermore, with
regard to the political aim of cohesion, regional and national disparities are still
present with respect to the recent economic advances. Likewise, the high and often
cited target mark of 3% gross domestic expenditures on R&D is at a current value
of 1.91% (Eurostat, estimated for 2006) still far from being achieved, which also
concerns the aspired global leading position. The comparative empirical study of
Crescenzi et al. (2007) ﬁnds evidence for a persisting technological gap of the EU in
comparison with the United States. The authors conclude that two reasons might
be responsible for this development: one is what they referred to as "national bias,"
which means the diversity of national innovation systems, and the second is the
"European concern with cohesion, even in the genesis of innovation".3
In this regard, a dispersive regional policy inevitably implies a waiving of spatial
eﬃciency due to lower external economies of scale. Furthermore, a subsidization
and redistribution contrary to agglomeration forces is associated with possibly high
budgetary eﬀorts due to thresholds, nonlinearities and discontinuities.4 Finally, con-
1Council Decision of 6th October 2006 on Community strategic guidelines on cohesion
(2006/702/EC).
2Strategic Report on the Renewed Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs: Launching the New
Cycle (2008-2010), COM(2007) 803, Brussels 11.12.2007.
3See Crescenzi et al. (2007), p. 31.
4See Baldwin et al. (2003) Chp. 9, for instance.
1sidering a regional and national policy competition, it might be questionable if the
way paved by the EU is eﬃcient and will really meet supranational objectives.
Considering the linkage between regional and innovation policy as it is accelerated
by the EU, the question arises if research promoting programmes are an appropriate
instrument to foster economic agglomeration also in the European periphery. The
leading thought of this approach is that a local research development is not only
limited to high-tech sectors, but may also induce multiplicative employment and
growth eﬀects in linked sectors.
However, these endeavors go along with a couple of economic and political aspects.
First, R&D activities are spatially concentrated, where the proximity to research
institutions, as well as technology adapting downstream sectors, is relevant, which
has been demonstrated by a multitude of empirical and theoretical publications.5
In this context, knowledge and knowledge production as an essential attribute of
high-tech clusters may be tacit, non-tradable and featuring a strong localization
due to (technological) spillover eﬀects. Second, the geographical concentration of
research capacities and linked industries is critically inﬂuenced by the mobility of
highly skilled labor. And third, the growth, evolution, and the macroeconomic rele-
vance of emerging industries may be exposed to immense technological, political or
social uncertainties.
Against the background of these problems, this paper addresses the following ques-
tions: 1) Which interdependencies determine the agglomeration of the research and
manufacturing industry? 2) Which impact has the proceeding trade integration upon
the spread and extent of R&D? 3) With respect to the conﬂict of agglomeration vs.
dispersion, which spatial formation implies a welfare improvement? 4) How does
a unilateral or regional R&D and innovation policy aﬀect the locational competi-
tion? 5) Do bilateral competing regional or national policies really lead to spatial
eﬃciency?
The paper approaches these leading questions by means of an extended model of the
New Economic Geography (NEG). The NEG is an analytical framework primarily
established by Krugman (1991), Krugman and Venables (1995), and Fujita (1988),
which considers geographical concentration based upon increasing returns, monopo-
listic competition and (iceberg) trade costs. As Fujita and Mori (2005) point out, the
"NEG remains to be the only general equilibrium framework in which the location
of agglomerations is determined explicitly through a microfounded mechanism".6 In
their survey article, the autors classify agglomeration forces into E-(conomic) and
K-(nowledge) linkages. While the ﬁrst category includes traditional mechanisms
induced by production and transactions of goods and services, the second involves
ideas and information creating local and global spillover eﬀects.
Models of the ﬁrst generation (see above) consider R&D activities only rudimenta-
rily within ﬁxed costs. The footloose entrepreneur model of Forslid and Ottaviano
5See, e.g., Feldman (1999) for a survey.
6See Fujita and Mori (2005), p. 379.
2(2003) extended this approach by an implementation of a skilled workforce as a
(ﬁxed) human capital. Simultaneously, Martin and Ottaviano (1999) and Baldwin
et al. (2001), later on Fujita and Thisse (2003) introduce technological spillover ef-
fects within an endogenous growth environment, where the capital is accounted to
be a knowledge stock produced by an innovation sector with a private and a public
output. The corresponding models orientate at renowned publications of Grossman
and Helpman (1991a,1991b), as well as Segerstrom et al. (1990) and Flam and Help-
man (1987). Recent works incorporating knowledge production and heterogeneity
of agents are published by Berliant et al. (2006).
For providing answers to the initial subject, this paper picks up the seminal core-
periphery model of Krugman (1991) and recombines it with endogenous R&D ac-
tivities of ﬁrms. We focus on the destabilizing eﬀects of highly-skilled migration,
commonly referred to as the brain drain. Furthermore, we concentrate on quality im-
proving R&D, which implies vertical product diﬀerentiation. For keeping the model
tractable and simple as possible, we neglect public good characteristics of knowledge
and knowledge creation, as well as endogenous spillover eﬀects. The policy part is
based upon the welfare implications derived from simple Pareto criteria. In addition,
the economic policy is simplifying assumed as a tax-subsidy income transfer between
factor groups, which ﬁnally sidesteps the modeling of a public sector. The major
advantage of this approach is that it does not require to assume either a (ulitarian)
welfare function or a government objective function because governmental action
can directly be derived from the welfare propositions.
In order to examine the key questions above, this paper is structured as follows. In
the next section we introduce the model assumptions and basic functionalities. In
Section 3, we analyze the equilibrium states in terms of existence and stability. At
this, we also consider the impact of exogenous asymmetries in country size devi-
ating from the standard symmetric constellation. Section 4 focuses on the welfare
analysis, which provides the formal legitimization for policy statements in Section
5. Finally, in Section 6, we return to the initial motivation of this paper, and derive
conclusions for the European R&D and innovation policy.
2 The Model
Private Demand





where A denotes the amount of a homogenous good produced by a traditional con-
stant return sector, henceforth considered to be an outside industry, which repre-
3sents all industries not in the focus of this model. M represents a subutility from










; ¾ > 1 ;ui > 0: (2)
The subutility depends upon the amount x consumed of a particular product sort i
out of the mass of (potential) varieties n. The parameter ¾ can easily be shown to
be equal to the constant elasticity of substitution. The parameter u characterizes
a further (vertical) dimension in the diﬀerentiation space, which can be interpreted
as the quality of a particular variety.
The manufactures are internationally tradable involving ad valorem trade costs
(Samuelson iceberg costs), t > 1, for goods shipped from location r to location









s ; s = 1;:::;S (3)
The utility parameter ¹ can be derived as the share in income, Y , spent for man-
ufactures. The price index P summarizes information about quality and prices, of
substitutes, whereat pr is the price of a particular variety. From two-stage budgeting,









Firms in the manufacturing sector use an increasing return technology for the pro-
duction of a particular variety, which involves labor as the only input factor. The
corresponding factor requirement of a single manufacturing ﬁrm in location s is
characterized by a ﬁxed and variable cost:
l
M
s = F + axs: (5)
Due to economies of scale and consumer preference for product diversity, each ﬁrm
produces only one diﬀerentiated variety, so that the ﬁrm number is equal to the
number of available product sorts. The ﬁrms are in position to increase the will-
ingness to pay of consumers by improving the quality of products, which, in turn,
7See also Anderson et al. (1992) for details.
4requires R&D investments. Following Sutton (1991), the level of quality is concave






; ° > 1; (6)
where r represents the price of one unit R&D, and ° the corresponding research
cost elasticity. Because manufacturing ﬁrms ﬁnance their R&D by sales revenues,
the proﬁt function is given by:
¼s = psxs ¡ Rs (us) ¡ wsF ¡ awsxs; (7)
where w denotes the wage rate for labor. Maximization leads to the standard mo-
nopolistic mark-up pricing. By normalizing a to (¾ ¡ 1)=¾, the proﬁt maximizing















From (8) it follows that ﬁrms tend to improve the quality of their products with:
i) increasing sales revenues; ii) an increasing monopolistic scope, given by a lower
substitution elasticity; and iii) decreasing research costs as a result of a decreasing
research price, or a lower research cost elasticity.
Assuming zero proﬁts, the long run equilibrium output of one manufacturing ﬁrm









Equation (9) implies that the ﬁrm size is by the term in brackets higher than in the
original Dixit-Stiglitz settings.
The R&D Sector
We introduce a separate research sector receiving the R&D expenditures of the
manufacturing industry, and in turn providing R&D services. We assume a linear
constant-return technology, where one unit of R&D requires one unit of scientiﬁc
labor input. Furthermore, the R&D industry features a strong localization, meaning
that a research facility in location s supplies its services for the manufacturing sector
in the same location only. These presumptions lead to the following implications:
i) R&D is not internationally tradable; ii) the size of the research sector determines
the quality and thus the demand for manufactures in the corresponding location;
and iii) in consequence of i) and ii), we implement strong vertical linkages between
5manufacturing and the research sector.8
The equilibrium research price, r, results from the market clearing condition: rsLR
s =
nsRs, where the turnover of the R&D sector on the left hand side is equal to the
amount of research expenditures of the whole manufacturing industry on the right
hand side. L indicates the amount of R&D output, while simultaneously represent-
ing the input of research personnel, n is the number of ﬁrms in the manufacturing







which simultaneously represents the wage rate for scientists. For the short run, we
assume a ﬁxed and price-inelastic supply of R&D and research personnel, respec-
tively. In the long run, researchers are internationally mobile responding to real
wage diﬀerentials. The migration of R&D personnel (and of R&D ﬁrms) follows the
NEG models’ commonly used ad hoc dynamics:9
_ s = (½s ¡ ½r)s(1 ¡ s): (11)
The parameter s denotes the share of global researchers in one particular location:
(LR
s =LR), which is henceforward country 1 in the two-location version of this model.
The real research price, ½, is deﬁned to be: rsP ¡¹
s . For analytical simplicity, the
global number of scientists, LR, is set equal to 1 so that s denotes the number of
researchers in location 1, and (1 ¡ s) in location 2.
Production Wages and Household Income
Wages for workers in the manufacturing sector come from the so-called wage equa-
tion, which represents the break-even rates a ﬁrm is willing to pay. The wage
equation can be derived from solving (3) for the price, p. With the monopolistic










The total supply of production labor is allocated between the traditional and the
manufacturing sector, where workers are inter-sectorally mobile. For simpliﬁcation,
8The localization assumption of innovative activities has been comprehensively proven by a
couple of empirical studies, basically Audretsch and Feldman (1996), Jaﬀe et al. (1993), and Feld-
man (1994), which strongly provide evidence that although the costs of transmitting information
are independent from spatial distance, the costs of transferring (tacit) knowledge determine local
spillover eﬀects.
9See Baldwin et al. (2003), Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the ad hoc dynamics.
6we set the total number of workers in both locations equal to one. In this way, the
number of workers in the manufacturing industry is conform with the corresponding
share ¸s, and the employment in the traditional sector corresponds with 1 ¡ ¸s.10
Furthermore, we assume for the traditional outside industry a linear 1:1 technology,
as we did for the R&D sector. This leads to an output, which quantity is the same
as the sectoral labor input. If we treat the traditional industry as numeraire and set
the price for its output equal to 1, the income of workers in this sector is 1¡¸. Via
inter-sectoral mobility, the normalized wages in the traditional sector are equalized
with the wages in the manufacturing sector. Finally, due to the (normalized) price
setting of the competitive monopolists, the prices for manufactures are likewise equal
to 1, which simpliﬁes the algebra again.
In the long run, implying zero ﬁrm proﬁts, the income of private households consists
of the production wage bill, as well as the revenues from the R&D sector:
Ys = w¸s + w(1 ¡ ¸s) + nsRs = 1 + nsRs: (13)







Equation (14) implies that the equilibrium research investments are the same for
each ﬁrm and each location. In consequence, the income of scientists in equation
(13) depends only upon the ﬁrm number in the local manufacturing industry.
In equilibrium, the total employment is equal to the total supply of manufacturing
workers: nslM
s = ¸s. From this market clearing condition and with the use of
equations (5) and (9), the number of manufacturing ﬁrms can be derived:
ns =
¸s (° ¡ 1)
F (¾° ¡ 1)
: (15)
Thus, the income of private households is:










10For the two-location version, the normalization implies that the global supply of production
workers is twice the global supply of scientists. Though this setting is arbitrary, the qualitative
results of the model are not aﬀected. See Section 5 for details.
7r2 =
¸2
(1 ¡ s)(¾° ¡ 1)
: (17b)














In combination with ﬁrm number (15) and product quality (18), the price indices

























































To understand the modeling results and to relate this paper to the standard NEG
literature, it is useful to consider the main eﬀects controlling the spatial allocation.
For these purposes we determine the total diﬀerentials at the symmetric equilibrium
so that, in the case of two symmetric locations, a change of a variable in location
1 goes along with an identical, but opposite, change in location 2. Considering a
change in income, for instance, dY1 is accompanied by ¡dY2. Using the expressions
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From equations (21) – (24) follows:
Result 2.1 Totally diﬀerentiating at the symmetric equilibrium reveals: i) a posi-
tive home-market eﬀect; ii) a negative price-index eﬀect with respect to both factor
groups; and iii) a positive research and manufacturing employment relationship.
Equation (21) reveals the so-called home-market eﬀect. The positive correlation
implies that an increase in income corresponds with an increase in manufacturing
employment. In contrast to the core-periphery model, this relationship is not nec-
essarily more than proportional. In fact, this result occurs only for small values
for ¾ and °. The dependency becomes more transparent by rearranging the term
in brackets. Solving equation (15) for this expression and using (14), we obtain:
(nsRs)=¸s. Keeping in mind that manufacturing wages are normalized by 1, the
term in brackets in equation (21) can be interpreted as the ratio of total R&D ex-
penditures and the manufacturing wage bill. This means if the R&D expenditures
are higher (lower) than the labor costs, we have a more (less) than proportional
employment eﬀect due to an increase in market size.
Equation (23) reveals a negative price-index eﬀect for both the manufacturing and
the researching population, where, according to Fujita et al. (1999), the trade cost
index, Z, is deﬁned to be:
Z ´
1 ¡ t1¡¾
1 + t1¡¾: (25)
In this regard, a larger manufacturing sector implies a lower price index due to a
reduction of trade costs and, thus, a higher local income and demand. An increasing
R&D sector leads to an increase in quality, which ﬁnally reduces the price index,
which also can be seen in equation (24).
Furthermore, by equalizing (22) and (24), we obtain:
d¸ =
·
2¾¹(¾° ¡ 1)(1 ¡ Z2)
Z (¹ ¡ ¾°)(¹ ¡ ¾Z (° ¡ 1)) + ¾ (¾° ¡ ¹)
¸
ds: (26)
Nominator and denominator in equation (26) are greater than zero implying a pos-
itive research and manufacturing employment linkage.
93 Equilibrium Analysis
Dispersion vs. Agglomeration Equilibrium
Considering the formal nature of this model, (16), (18), (19) and (20) describe a
system of eight nonlinear simultaneous equations, where (11) speciﬁes the equilib-
rium condition. The diﬀerential equation has three stationary points: i) at s = 1,
where the R&D sector is totally agglomerated in 1; ii) at s = 0, where the R&D
sector agglomerates in 2; and iii) for a zero diﬀerential: ½1 = ½2.
In the symmetric equilibrium, all variables are constant except from the price in-
dex that is increasing with trade costs. In consequence, the real research price is
increasing with trade costs as well.
Figure 1 shows s, the share of researchers in location 1, with respect to trade costs.
This kind of comparative-static illustration is also referred to as bifurcation or tom-
ahawk diagram concerning the progression and structure of multiple equilibria.
[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
Usually, the spatial formation of industries is considered in respect of a decline in
trade costs. Starting from a high level of trade costs, a stable equilibrium (continuous
bold line) appears at the symmetry, s = 0:5, while the agglomeration equilibria,
s = 0;1, are unstable (dashed line). This implies a dispersive distribution of R&D
and manufacturing industries that is unaﬀected by trade costs.
At a critical level, indicated by the so-called sustain point, tS, the globally stable
symmetric equilibrium becomes locally stable as a result of an alternating stability
in the agglomeration equilibria. Later on, for trade costs lower than the break
point, tB, the symmetric equilibrium turns from stable to unstable, where the spatial
distribution of both R&D and manufacturing industries takes form of the core-
periphery outcome.
Result 3.1 In the core-periphery constellation, the whole manufacturing and R&D
industries agglomerate in the core, while in the periphery the traditional sector is
the only industry remaining.
This results from a complete withdrawal of researchers from the periphery, which
reduces the quality of products locally manufactured. This, in turn, ceases the cor-
responding demand and the output of the manufacturing industry, which starts to
relocate to the neighboring country with the larger sales market. In the agglom-
eration equilibrium, where the manufacturing industry and the research sector are
entirely concentrated in one location, the earnings of private households in the core
consist of the labor income plus the returns of the scientiﬁc workforce. In the pe-
ripheral location, the income comes only from labor totally employed in the constant
return sector.
10In between of break and sustain points, also commonly classiﬁed as medium trade
costs, we obtain three locally stable equilibria in symmetry and total agglomeration,
as well as two additional unstable equilibria starting from total agglomeration at tS
and converging to the symmetric equilibrium at the break point, tB.
In addition to Figure 1, this model features a second fundamental variable, the
product quality in the manufacturing industry. In this context, Figure 2 shows the
corresponding bifurcation diagram.
[Insert Figure 2 about here.]
Based upon the stylized Figure 2 and apparent in equations (54) and (59a), it can
be concluded:
Result 3.2 In the case of initially symmetric locations, the level of product quality
in dispersion as well as in the agglomerated core is constant and thus, independent
from trade costs. The quality in the periphery is zero as a result of a total relocation
of R&D and the manufacturing industry.
The constant level of quality constitutes a maximum that can be generated by the
R&D facilities available in this economy. As given by equation (8), the quality
depends only upon the market price for research services. In the agglomeration
equilibrium, the number of manufacturing ﬁrms and scientists in the core is twice
as in dispersion, which can easily be seen by equations (15), (53), and (58), respec-
tively. Because the demand of a particular manufacturing ﬁrm for R&D services is
ﬁxed, equation (10) is constant in both agglomeration and dispersion equilibrium,
since the ratio of supply and demand remains the same. In consequence, this level
of quality is globally stable beyond break and sustain points. This implies that the
quality of products available is always constant, before and after agglomeration.11
In this context, the periphery, here location 2, does not produce manufactures due
to a lack of the R&D sector that is totally relocated. Therefore, the corresponding
quality, ¹ u2, becomes zero for trade costs lower than tB. Although no R&D industry
exists in region 2, there is still a hypothetical level of quality that would be generated
if there would be any research activity. This hypothetical quality is represented by
the (red) dashed line marking the lower limit of the unstable equilibrium arm.
However, between the critical trade costs values we observe two locally stable equi-
librium qualities: i) location 1 is either in a dispersive equilibrium, or it becomes
the core, which corresponds with the same quality level; ii) location 2 is either in
a dispersive equilibrium, or it becomes the periphery implying the total loss of the
manufacturing and R&D sectors and a zero quality.
11These results may diﬀer assuming spillover eﬀects.
11Stability
Because of the static nature of this model, the stability of equilibria is ascertained
via the ad hoc dynamics given by equation (11). For illustrating an out of equi-
librium adjustment process, it is quite common to plot the real wage diﬀerential
against the share of the mobile workforce. In this context, Figure 3 shows the real
research wage gap, ½1 ¡ ½2, with respect to the share of scientists, s, in location 1
for diﬀerent levels of trade costs.
[Insert Figure 3 about here.]
Due to the non-closeness, the wage diﬀerential can only numerically be determined.
The diagrams in Figure 3 are plotted for a speciﬁc parameter constellation that is
henceforth used as a reference case in the course of this paper.
The stability of solutions can heuristically be proven: a positive (negative) wage
diﬀerential implies an increasing (decreasing) share of researchers. As apparent,
this model always features one symmetric and two corner solutions, where the ﬁlled
dots represent a stable and the blank dots an unstable equilibrium.
Having a closer look on the evolution of the equilibria constellation, we can observe
converging diﬀerentials of the unstable corner solutions, until the sustain point,
tS, where both equilibria exhibit a zero-diﬀerential. From this point on, the core-
periphery constellation becomes stable. For trade costs lower than tS, the corner
solutions are diverging again. At the break point, tB, the slope of the symmetric
equilibrium changes its sign turning from negative to positive. This implies an
alternation of the stability from stable to unstable – the core-periphery equilibrium
becomes the only outcome.
Sustain and break points are determined using the same approach as suggested by
Fujita et al. (1999)12. The sustain point can be found by identifying the trade costs
level, where the wage diﬀerential of the agglomeration equilibrium becomes zero.
The corresponding trade cost level solves:
t
S ! (¾° + ¹)t
1¡¾¡¹=° + (¾° ¡ ¹)t
¾¡1¡¹=° ¡ 2°¾ = 0: (27)
By numerical inspection, equation (27) reveals the same qualitative characteristics
of the comparative statics as the standard core-periphery model. An increasing
substitution elasticity, ¾, shifts the sustain point towards 1, because an increasing
homogeneity of manufactures narrows the relevance of international trade. In ad-
dition, the larger the manufacturing sector, represented by an increasing share in
household income, ¹, the larger is the range of trade costs, which contain a sustain
core-periphery equilibrium. Furthermore, the research cost elasticity, °, as an ad-
ditional parameter within this model, reveals the same comparative statics like the
12See Appendix for detailed derivations.
12substitution elasticity, ¾: the higher ° implying an increasing costliness of R&D,
the lower is the sustain point.
The break point can be determined by totally diﬀerentiating at the symmetric equi-
librium. Hence, the equation system can be reduced to d½=ds = 0. Solving for trade
costs, we obtain the marginal case, where the slope at the symmetric equilibrium




(¹ ¡ ¾°)(¹ ¡ ° (¾ ¡ 1))




For positive values of tB, the second term in the nominator of (28) must be negative.
From this term, the so-called no-back-hole condition can be derived:13
¹ < ° (¾ ¡ 1): (29)
The comparative statics of the break point qualitatively corresponds with the orig-
inal core-periphery model: tB increases with an increasing ¹ and decreases with a
rising homogeneity of manufactures, ¾. Additionally, an increase in the cost inten-
sity of R&D, expressed by the parameter °, reduces the break point level, too.
Asymmetric Locations
We previously assumed that both countries feature the same number of production
workers employed in the manufacturing, as well as in the traditional, sector. Devi-
ating from this simpliﬁcation, we treat location 1 as numeraire and normalize the
number of production workers LM
1 to 1. The size of the production labor force in
location 2, LM
2 is deﬁned to be a, where a > 0. Thus, the standard symmetric
case is a knife-edge version of this general setting, where a = 1. Henceforth, the
employment in the manufacturing sector of location 2 is a¸2, and in the traditional
sector: a(1 ¡ ¸2).
Figure 4 shows the bifurcation diagram for the case that location 2 is 1% larger than
location 1 (parameter values: ¾ = 2, ° = 2, ¹ = 0:5, F = 1, a = 1:01).
[Insert Figure 4 about here.]
Compared to symmetric locations, the structure of the tomahawk diagram has lost
its simplicity. Instead of one, two sustain points occur, the path of the stable
equilibrium right from the break point is bent towards an agglomeration within
the larger country. As a result, the break point also appears shifted away from
symmetry. The reason for these distortions may be retraced by considering Figure 3
again. A smaller country size aﬀects the real research wages via a higher price index.
13See Appendix.
13This implies that the wage gap function shifts downward originating the deviations
from the symmetric equilibrium.
The trade cost levels indicating the ﬁrst sustain point (s = 1) solves the equation:14
¹ t
S ! (a¾° + a¹)t
1¡¾¡¹=° + a(¾° ¡ ¹)t
¾¡1¡¹=° ¡ (1 + a)°¾ = 0: (30)
Respectively, the second sustain point (s = 0) can be derived from:
t
S ! (a¾° + ¹)t
1¡¾¡¹=° + (¾° ¡ ¹)t
¾¡1¡¹=° ¡ (1 + a)°¾ = 0: (31)
The second sustain point is singular and always existing for t > 1.15 The break point
can only be numerically investigated, but appears between the sustain points in the
majority of cases. While the second sustain point is always given, the ﬁrst sustain
point as well as the break point disappear with an increasing exogenous asymmetry,
a, which ﬁnally determines how far the stable path is moved away from symmetry.16
However, for the analysis of the critical trade cost values it may be useful to consider
a couple of numerical examples. Table 1 shows the comparative statics of both
sustain points with respect to changes in substitution and research elasticity, ¾ and
°, the size of the manufacturing sector, ¹, and the asymmetry parameter, a. The
computations are based upon a ﬁxed parameter constellation given below the table,
where each column shows the ceteris paribus changes in the corresponding variable.
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
As apparent, the numerical results reveal the same dependencies as in the case of
symmetric locations. The trade cost values of the sustain points decrease with de-
creasing horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation indicated by an increasing ¾ and °,
and increase the larger is the income share for manufactures, ¹. Furthermore, in-
creasing the asymmetry parameter, a, the ﬁrst sustain point moves towards 1 and
the second moves in the opposite direction. This implies that the larger the disparity
in country size, the sooner occurs the point of total agglomeration.
Although, from the technical point of view, the assignment which location becomes
the core and which one becomes the periphery is still ambiguous; the common litera-
ture states that the smaller country tends to be the periphery.17 The argumentation
is based upon the magnitude of exogenous shocks that must be suﬃciently high to
14The bar above (below) t denotes s = 1 (s = 0).
15Proof: If the no-black-hole condition holds, the function (31) shows i) a unique minimum for
t > 1; ii) an intersection with the trade costs axis at t = 1; and iii) a negative slope at t = 1.
Hence, there must be a second axis intersection for t > 1 solving equation (31).







< 2. This minimum appears for positive as well as negative values so that a root for
t > 1 is not inevitably existent.
17See Baldwin et al. (2003) and Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), for instance.
14make smaller locations become the industrialized core.
With increasing trade integration, country size asymmetry implies that the R&D
capacity within the smaller country continuously diminishes until the break point
is reached. At this critical trade cost level, the smaller location abruptly loses its
residual R&D sector. Summing up, R&D mobility entails a destabilizing potential
for smaller countries to the advantage of larger neighbors attracting scientists and
the corresponding industry.
How does asymmetry aﬀect the quality of manufactures? Figure 5 shows the corre-
sponding bifurcation diagram for the product quality in location 1.
[Insert Figure 5 about here.]
As apparent, for high trade costs right from the ﬁrst sustain point, the quality in
location 1 continuously decreases due to a migration of scientists to location 2, so
that it can be stated:
Result 3.3 With exogenous asymmetry in country size, the quality of manufactures
produced in the larger country feature a higher quality.18 Due to the home-market
eﬀect and the research-manufacturing employment linkage, an increasing quality of
local manufactures increases demand, income and, consequently, the employment of
additional R&D capacities. This cumulative causation leads to agglomeration within
the larger country for decreasing trade costs.
Left from the break point, the quality in the larger country is constant with respect
to the trade cost level again because this location has attracted the whole research
activities at ﬁxed R&D expenditures.
Interim Results
Based upon the previous ﬁndings, the outcome of this model allows a couple of
conclusions:
1. Via cumulative causation, the production follows the R&D and vice versa.
2. A spatial specialization of R&D and the manufacturing sector is no potential
outcome due to strong vertical linkages.
3. The settings allow catastrophic agglomeration as a common feature of the core-
periphery model, but the "disastrous" extent for the peripheral region depends
upon the importance of the manufacturing industry in the whole economic
context. If the manufacturing industry is characterized by a low share in
income, ¹, a total relocation has a minor impact on welfare, in contrast to an
industry exhibiting a dominant macroeconomic relevance.
18Indeed, this outcome has been conﬁrmed by a couple of empirical studies, e.g., Hummels and
Klenow (2005), Greenaway and Torstensson (2000).
154. In the case of symmetric locations, international trade and R&D mobility do
not aﬀect the level of product quality as a result of a ﬁxed ﬁrm size and
identical endowments of scientists.
5. A numerical analysis of break and sustain points reveals that international
mobility of scientists aﬀects the spatial formation of industries. But compared
with the original core-periphery model of Krugman (1991), this impact is less
destabilizing than the mobility of workers, which can be seen at lower values
for the critical points, tS and tB.
The immanent instability of spatial dispersion and the risk of a total loss of manu-
facturing and research, especially for smaller countries, raise the question if a sub-
sidization of local R&D may counteract deindustrialization. The following sections
take up this consideration and analyze political intervention against the background
of social welfare.
4 Welfare and Spatial Eﬃciency
This section addresses the eﬃciency and optimality of agglomeration vs. dispersion.
The considerations are based upon a global perspective incorporating the welfare
of the population in both locations. With respect to external economies of scale as
well as the distribution of social welfare, we examine the legitimization of location
and research promoting policy instruments applied by supra-regional institutions.
In the course of this paper, the ﬁndings provide the basis for the analysis of R&D
and innovation policy instruments in the next section.
For these purposes, the approach of Charlot et al. (2006) and Baldwin et al. (2003)
is applied. As discussed by the authors, the speciﬁcation of a social welfare function
is associated with an aggregation problem involving inequality aversion of two factor
groups within two locations. However, instead of following this utilitarian approach,
we rather focus on the analysis of Pareto-dominance combined with Kaldor-Hicks
compensation criteria.
Pareto Dominance
Individual welfare is measured as the (maximized) consumer utility that can be de-
rived as the real household income, Y P ¡¹. The nominal income, Y = Y P + nR
consists of i) ﬁxed production wages, Y P = 1, that is the same in both equilibrium
states; and ii) the income of scientists. As mentioned above, the ratio of R&D de-
mand and supply is equal in both equilibrium states so that the nominal research
wage is also the same.19
In summation, the real income of production workers as well as scientists leads to
19See equations (56) and (61a).
16a comparison of price indices.20 In the agglomeration equilibrium, where the whole
manufacturing industry gathers in the core (henceforth, location 1), the price index
takes the lowest value compared with the peripheral location and the dispersion equi-
librium. Because in the dispersive case the manufacturing is evenly spread across
both locations, the corresponding price index is lower than in the periphery. Thus,
it can be concluded:
Result 4.1 Production workers in the core always prefer agglomeration, and pro-
duction workers in the periphery always prefer dispersion due to higher real incomes.
In this context and with the same argument, researchers always prefer agglomeration.
In conclusion, whether agglomeration or dispersion is a Pareto dominant equilibrium
state because the labor force is split in agglomeration winners (production workers
in the core and researchers) and agglomeration losers (production workers in the
periphery).
Compensation Tests
In accordance to Kaldor (1939) and Hicks (1940), potential compensations between
agglomeration winners and losers are next to be veriﬁed. In the ﬁrst step, we proof
if the winning factor group is able to compensate the disadvantaged production
workers for remaining in the periphery in the sense of Kaldor. For utility equalization


















which corresponds with the outcome of Charlot et al. (2006). After compensation,
the income of production workers in location 2 becomes ¹ Y P
2 = 1+C. The income of
the winning factor groups, workers and scientists in 1, is given by: ¹ Y1 = 1+¹ r1¡CK.
In the dispersion equilibrium, the winners would earn: 1+2Y R
s . The net welfare in
the sense of Kaldor is the diﬀerence of real income of the agglomeration winners in
agglomeration and dispersion:
¢W
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1 ¡ (1 + r)P
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s ; (34)
where r = ¹ r1 = rs. The sign of the net welfare (34) depends upon the level of trade
costs:
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¹ ¡ (¾° + ¹) ? 0: (35)
20See equations (55), (60a), and (60b).
17From equation (35) follows:
Result 4.2 For trade costs lower than a critical value tK, agglomeration is preferred
to dispersion due to a positive net welfare of agglomeration winners.21
With respect to the Hicks compensation tests, the argumentation of Charlot et al.
(2006) is based upon the allocation eﬀects of a real redistributive transfer. Assuming
that agglomeration losers compensate the winners by the amount of welfare surplus
they would waive by staying in the symmetric equilibrium, such a transfer would
prevent the clearing of factor and labor markets. The authors conclude that a (real)
Hicks compensation is not feasible and thus agglomeration is always preferred to
dispersion, taking into account the results of the Kaldor tests.
However, this paper deviates from this approach and follows the argumentation of a
hypothetical compensation rather than assuming a real transfering system. In this

















The corresponding net welfare of the losing factor group, the peripheral production















Dispersion compared to agglomeration represents a Pareto improvement in the sense
of Hicks if the welfare of production workers in the (symmetric) location 2 is positive
after compensating the agglomeration winners in 1. This situation is given by:
¢W






¡ (¾° ¡ ¹)t
¡¹ ¡ (¾° + ¹) ? 0: (38)
From equation (38) follows:
Result 4.3 For trade costs higher than a critical level tH, dispersion is preferred to
agglomeration in the sense of Hicks.
This result diﬀers from the outcome of the referenced study, where the authors state
that only agglomeration is a Pareto improvement until the critical trade cost level tK
is reached. Due to diverging concepts of compensation, this paper ﬁnds that a range
of trade costs exists where dispersion might be a preferred equilibrium outcome. In
this context, Figure 6 shows the net welfare functions with respect to trade costs
for the standard numerical example.
21K is mnemonic for Kaldor.
18[Insert Figure 6 about here.]
For the numerical case considered, there are two range of trade costs where either
agglomeration is preferred in the sense of Kaldor (1 < t < tK), or dispersion is
preferred in the sense of Hicks (tH < t). Between the critical levels, any statements
about potential Pareto improvements are not possible. In this regard, the break
and sustain points remarkably appear in between. This implies that with decreas-
ing trade costs, dispersion loses its welfare dominance sooner than the economy
reaches the core-periphery outcome. Furthermore, agglomeration later appears to
be a clear Pareto improvement than the core-periphery formation actually becomes
established.
Varying Research Potential
With regard to the arbitrary setting of the global number of scientists (LR = 1),
the question may arise if the results of the welfare analysis crucially depend upon
the size of this factor group, which beneﬁts from agglomeration. Based upon this
consideration, an increasing number of internationally mobile researchers may imply
an increasing potential for compensating agglomeration losers. In turn, in the sense
of Hicks, this may imply a higher claim for compensation to be borne by production
workers in the (potential) periphery, so that agglomeration becomes increasingly a
Pareto improvement the larger the size of the researcher population.
However, this outcome appears not to be imminent considering the competitive re-
search market. The higher the supply of researchers and of R&D, respectively, the
lower is the corresponding market price. This leads to an increase in the product
quality and simultaneously to a reduction of the price-quality index. Because this
aﬀects each individual manufacturing ﬁrm, the demand for manufactures ﬁnally re-
mains unchanged.22 At a constant demand, ﬁrm size remains constant as well, and
for this reason the R&D expenditures, too. This ﬁnally results in unaﬀected research
investments of the total industry, which implies lower per-capita income of scientists.
All in all, the nominal household income remains the same, while the price index
declines. In consequence, the welfare is higher in the case of an increasing researcher
population. Having a look on the corresponding price indices for both equilibria,
agglomeration and dispersion, they reveal the impact of an increasing number of
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; ¹ P2 = ¹ P1t: (40)
22This can easily be seen by considering simplifying a closed economy. The demand is x =
¹Y p¡¾P¾¡1. For symmetric varieties, the price index becomes: P1¡¾ = n¡1u¡1p¾¡1. Substitution
yields a demand that is independent from quality, u, eventually.
19These price indices diﬀer from the basic price indices, (55) and (60), only in terms
of the ﬁrst expression in brackets. This implies that the trade cost values, where the
net welfare functions, (34) and (37), become zero, must be identical to the values
solving (35) and (38). In consequence, it can be stated:
Result 4.4 The critical trade cost values, tK and tH, are independent from the total
number of scientists. Hence, a political intervention in terms of an increase in R&D
capacities leads to a higher social welfare, but it does not aﬀect the evaluation of
equilibria in terms of Kaldor and Hicks.
Numerical Calibration
General results beyond this numerical example, especially with regard to the ex-
istence of both critical trade cost values, tK and tH, are not possible due to non-
closeness of equations (35) and (38). Following Charlot et al. (2006), a numerical
analysis of parameter values in real economic domains draws a rough picture about
the welfare situation within this model. In this context, Table 2 shows the cali-
bration results, which are structured in the same way as demonstrated for Table
1.23
[Insert Table 2 about here.]
Although this sample lacks generality, some observations can still be made: i) both
values are always separated, while tK < tH; ii) the critical trade cost value of the
Hicks compensation test disappears for large values of the income share, ¹; iii) vary-
ing the substitution elasticity, ¾, reveals that tH falls below the sustain point, for
values larger than 5, even below the break point, while tK is always smaller than
break and sustain points; iv) the critical values show the same comparative static
behavior like the break and sustain points (increasing with decreasing ¾ and °,
and increasing with ¹). Summarizing, the numerical investigation demonstrates the
complexity of welfare statements with respect to industrial agglomeration. If an
equilibrium represents a Pareto improvement, it critically depends upon the param-
eter constellation, which is nonetheless evidently sensitive with respect to exogenous
changes.
Complementing these results from a supra-national perspective, the next section
considers ﬁrst the impact of a unilateral R&D policy, and second the case of con-
ﬂicting bilateral policies.
23The parameters are oriented to the range of values given by Charlot et al. (2006), following
Head and Mayer (2004).
205 R&D and Innovation Policy
In the course of the policy analysis during this section, the paper focuses on the
impact of a public R&D policy within one country, which henceforward will be loca-
tion 2. Considering the outcomes of the previous sections, the social welfare of the
population in the core is higher than in the periphery. Starting from dispersion but
threatening agglomeration (the economy is close to the break point), an individual
national policy would most likely take actions to avoid the situation in which the
domestic location (2) becomes the periphery. A political goal may be that the dis-
persion is maintained, or, better yet, the location 2 becomes the industrialized core.
In this model, a policy meant to promote local R&D involves the subsidization of
private R&D activities. With regard to real economic policy, a large repertory of
instruments is utilized ranging from public funding of research projects, start-up
promotion for high-tech ﬁrms, and tax abatements for private R&D expenditures,
for instance.
Based upon the previous considerations, this section concerns three major questions:
1) Does a unilateral subsidization of R&D lead to a reallocation of industrial ac-
tivities to the advantage of the intervening location? 2) In the case that country 2
is smaller: Which amount of subsidization has to be transferred to balance out the
corresponding local disadvantage? 3) In contrast to a centrally planned or coopera-
tive solution between both countries, as described in Section 4, what is the outcome
of conﬂicting bilateral R&D policies? 4) Does this locational competition lead to a
socially preferred outcome?
R&D Subsidies in the Symmetric Case
Based upon the ﬁndings in the previous section, the government in country 2 aims
its own location to become the industrialized core knowing that all its inhabitants
would beneﬁt due to higher real incomes. Starting from a situation, in which both
locations are in the dispersion equilibrium, the government in 2 decides to introduce
a system of income transfer between both factor groups. The simple idea is that a
lump-sum subsidy for the mobile scientiﬁc workforce may imply a suﬃcient incen-
tive to migrate towards location 2. The subsidy is ﬁnanced by a (non-distorting)
lump-sum tax, 0 < ¿ < 1, paid by the immobile production workers in 2. Because
the transfer is only realized between the inhabitants of one location, the nominal
income of households remains the same as in the model without distributive inter-
vention. Thus, the equations (16), (18), (19), and (20) describing the system do not
change, contrary to the equilibrium condition given by (11), where the real research
price in location 2 becomes: ½2 = (r2 + ¿)P
¡¹
2 . Because the real research earn-
ings of scientists in 2 are higher after subsidization, the real wage diﬀerential curve
must be shifted downwards. This results in a distortion of the tomahawk symmetry
generating a bifurcation that is the same as for exogenous asymmetry. Indeed, the
subsidization produces an allocation as if location 2 would be larger in terms of
























¿ = 0; (41)
























¹ = 0: (42)
Against the background of these possibilities the question arises: What is the opti-
mum R&D policy to aﬀect industrial agglomeration for location 2?
First of all, it must be constituted if the government follows a strategy of instanta-
neous agglomeration at given trade costs. However, this policy may go along with
a high burden for tax payers depending upon the degree of trade integration. In
contrast, policymakers could also aim to achieve total agglomeration in the long
run, while trade costs decrease. This approach is based upon the tendency of lo-
cation 2 to agglomerate as a result of a quasi-exogenous asymmetry induced by a
subsidy. Which strategy is chosen, depends upon the time preference of the eco-
nomic agents, as well as the tax burden the production workers are willing to accept.
A. Instantaneous Agglomeration
For the case that policymakers in location 2 aim to achieve instantaneous agglomer-
ation within their home country, they set a subsidy that completely shifts the wage
gap function below zero. By means of Figure 3, it becomes apparent that the (real)
subsidy, necessary to push location 2 into the core, depends upon the level of trade
costs. Again, it is useful to diﬀerentiate between three cases: 1) For high trade costs
(e.g., t = 2:5), the corresponding real subsidy is equal to the wage diﬀerential at
s = 0. 2) If the trade integration continues, the maximum of the wage gap curve
separates from the corner solution at a certain level of trade costs (approximately
t = 1:9 in terms of Figure 3). 3) In the third stage, the wage diﬀerential of the
corner solution s = 1 outruns the wage gap maximum (t = 1:85 in Figure 3).
1. For high trade costs, where the corner solution s = 0 gives the highest wage
gap value, the corresponding subsidy ¿0 can be derived from equation (42) by
solving for ¿:25
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24The subscripts denote subsidy – the situation after introducing income transfers; the super-
scripts still stand for sustain point.
25Furthermore, it can easily be shown that production workers in the subsidized core feature a
higher welfare due to agglomeration, in spite of a lump-sum tax, until a critical level of trade costs,
t > 1, has passed. For trade costs higher than this level, the welfare loss in the course of taxation
is higher than the welfare gain due to a lower price index.
22where T 0 is the domain of trade costs in which the corner solution s = 0 is
relevant.
2. In the second stage, the critical subsidy given by the inner maximum of the
wage gap curve can only numerically be determined. At a given level of trade
costs, T 00, this subsidy fulﬁlls:
¿
00 (t 2 T
00) ! t = t
B
S; (44)
where T 00 is the domain of trade costs in which the inner maximum of the wage
diﬀerential curve, @­=@s = 0, is relevant.
3. Finally, for achieving instantaneous agglomeration, a policy concerning the
corner solution s = 1 has to be applied in the third stage. The corresponding
critical subsidy can be derived from equation (41):
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where T 000 is analogically the domain of trade costs in which the relevant target
value is represented by the wage diﬀerential at the corner solution s = 1.
For illustration, Figure 7 shows the critical subsidy that ensures instantaneous ag-
glomeration with respect to trade costs.
[Insert Figure 7 about here.]
As apparent, the curve decreases for high trade costs (¿0) following the corner solu-
tion s = 0. From the point, where the policy alternates from equation (43) to (44),
the curve (¿00) is kinked and decreases with a lower slope. Finally, where the wage
diﬀerential at the corner solution s = 1 exceeds the inner maximum, the subsidy
(¿000) increases again due to stronger agglomeration forces. After a unique maximum,
the curve declines towards zero for t ! 1. Furthermore, while the sustain point level
of trade costs is always element of T 00, the trade costs indicating the break point are
always in the domain of T 000.
B. Long Run Agglomeration
In the case that policymakers decide to achieve agglomeration in the long run pre-
suming decreasing trade costs, it is useful to distinguish two initial situations: 1)
trade costs are higher; and 2) trade costs are lower than the sustain point level. The
optimum R&D policy is illustrated by a numerical example given by the parameters:
¾ = 2, ° = 2, and ¹ = 0:4. The break point occurs at: tB = 1:8333, the sustain
point at: tS = 1:8567. Introducing a subsidy, ¿ = 0:001, yields two sustain points for
s = 1 at ¹ tS
S;1 = 1:0076 and ¹ tS
S;2 = 1:8448, one sustain point for s = 0 at tS
S = 1:8717.
A break point does not exist. For cases i) and ii), the following policy statements
can be formulated:
231. For trade costs higher than the sustain point, a subsidization leads to a mi-
gration of scientists towards location 2, which makes s decrease. Potentially,
the new break and sustain points, tS
S and tB
S, are immediately reached de-
pending upon the level of subsidization. As long as the trade costs are above
the (uncontrolled) sustain point level, tS, a cancelation of the transfer system
would lead back to dispersion again. Accordingly, the subsidization must be
maintained until i) location 2 becomes the core (t < tB
S), and ii) the trade
costs become suﬃciently low so that the (symmetric) sustain point, t < tS has
passed. This ﬁnally ensures that location 2 becomes the (locally) stable core
after stopping subsidization. Considering the parameterized example, trade
costs are t = 2, for instance, the research sector is almost totally agglomer-
ated in location 2. After reaching the sustain point, tS, a subsidization is not
necessary anymore because the core-periphery equilibrium is (locally) stable.
2. For trade costs lower than the sustain point level, and agglomeration in the
competing location, the subsidy should be set in order to move the (asym-
metric) sustain point s = 1 leftwards. In terms of the wiggle diagram, this
policy implies a downward shift of the wage gap function, until the corner
solution s = 1 becomes negative. This ﬁnally destabilizes the core in location
1, the economy alternates to the decreasing arm in the tomahawk diagram
generating an increasing advantage for location 2. In the case of the numerical
example, we assume trade costs at t = 1:84 again. Increasing the subsidy to
¿ = 0:002 makes the opposite sustain points diverge from each other. The
critical sustain points become: ¹ tS
S;2 = 1:8326 and tS
S = 1:8864. In consequence,
location 2 attracts the whole R&D and manufacturing industry. However, the
subsidization may be limited for very low trade costs. Assuming a very large
manufacturing sector with ¹ = 0:8 and a very low costliness of R&D with
° = 1:3, the corresponding targeted sustain point is ¹ tS
S;2 = 10:2567 that can be
just realized by subsidy of ¿ = 1. For trade costs below this level, a way out of
the periphery is impossible for location 2. In this context, the maximum tax
burden, ¿ = 1, which is the whole income of production workers, is totally ex-
hausted. With regard to a more realistic picture, the maximum reasonable tax
rate would be much lower, so that the domain of parameter values restricting
this agglomeration trap becomes much larger.
R&D Subsidies and Exogenous Asymmetry
In the next step, we pursue the question: If location 2 is smaller in terms of coun-
try size, how can its government implement a subsidization policy to alleviate the
disadvantageous eﬀects of agglomeration?
As shown in Section 3, an exogenous diﬀerence in country size shifts the wage gap
function. For the situation now considered, where location 2 is smaller, this curve
moves upwards implying a stable arm in the tomahawk diagram that is bent towards
24s = 1. In contrast, an R&D subsidy works like an artiﬁcial country enlargement,
because the wage gap function is shifted downwards. Hence, a subsidy level exists
where the disadvantage of country size is totally compensated by the subsidization
eﬀect. Based upon this consideration, the government in location 2 should imple-
ment a subsidy (and tax) that is larger than this critical level. In consequence, the
smaller country would gain a migration tendency directed to total agglomeration for
trade costs lower than the break point level.
For determining the critical level of subsidization, it is necessary to equate the sym-
metric with the asymmetric diﬀerential and solve for the subsidy, ¿. Following this
approach, two problems occur: First, due to non-closeness, the wage gap can only
numerically computed, except from the symmetric and corner solutions. Second,
while a subsidy implies a parallel shift of the wage diﬀerential curve, an exogenous
diﬀerence in country size also changes the shape of this curve. Hence, the crit-
ical level of subsidization pushing the smaller country to agglomeration can only

















Figure 8 plots the subsidy, ¿¤, with respect to trade costs for the standard numerical
example.
[Insert Figure 8 about here.]
The curve features three essential attributes: 1) The subsidy totally compensating
a disadvantage in terms of country size is unique and positive for trade costs, t > 1.
2) For a = 1 and t = 1 the subsidy is zero. 3) The subsidy varies with the degree of
trade openness, where the subsidization increases with increasing trade costs.26This
results from higher price indices implying larger real wage diﬀerentials, which have
to be overcome by the subsidy.
In addition to the considerations about the optimum R&D policy in the symmetric
case, as given in the previous subsection, the government in 2 is in the position to
route its country to agglomeration in spite of an initial disadvantage in terms of
country size. According to the instantaneous agglomeration strategy as described
above, the critical subsidy given by equation (46) has to be added on top the values
of (42), (44) , and (45), respectively. For the case that political decision-makers aim
to achieve long run agglomeration, the corresponding subsidy has to exceed ¿¤.
Conﬂicting Bilateral Policies
In the case of opposite policies in two symmetric countries, the considerations above
26For large values of ¾ and °, the subsidy features a unique maximum and a moderate decline
right from this point.
25may lead to an escalation of the R&D subsidy competition. Because agglomera-
tion implies a welfare improvement for researchers as well as production workers in
the core, both governments aim to direct their own locations into agglomeration.
Contemplating the situation like a sequential game, one country would exceed the
subsidy of the other country to ﬁnally gain an agglomeration advantage.
To formally treat this situation, we refer to the results above and assume by reason
of formal simplicity that both countries follow an instantaneous agglomeration strat-
egy. The basic principle of an R&D and innovation policy is still the same: a subsidy
introduced by country 2 leads to a downward shift of the wage gap function. With
regard to the policy implications above, one country would, given a policy of the
rivalling country, consequently choose a subsidy according to equations (43), (44),
and (45), respectively. To that above, we distinguish between three cases according
to the degree of trade integration: 1) high trade costs (t 2 T 0); 2) medium trade
costs (t 2 T 00); and 3) low trade costs (t 2 T 000).
1. At a given level of high trade costs, t 2 t0, both locations follow a subsidization
policy according to equation (43). Since both countries implement a transfer
system, the subsidy in one location is set with respect to trade costs, and a
given level of subsidy in the competing location. The corresponding symmetric
reaction functions in the terms of a Cournot competition are:
¿1 (¿2;t) = ¿
0 + ¿2t
¡¹ (47a)
¿2 (¿1;t) = ¿
0 + ¿1t
¡¹ (47b)
Equations (47) are illustrated in Figure 9 by means of a speciﬁc numerical
example.
[Insert Figure 9 about here.]
Generally, both functions are linearly increasing. Concluding from equation
(42), the critical subsidy, ¿0, is always positive. Furthermore, the reaction
function ¿2 intersects the antagonistic curve ¿1 always from above because t >
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0: (48)
In spite of a lack of generality, we can again derive a couple of results from nu-
merical investigations. Table 3 shows the equilibrium subsidy with respect to
trade costs for several parameter constellations in the same way, as illustrated
in Tables 1 and 2, where ﬁelds without values are out of the domain t 2 T 0.
26[Insert Table 3 about here.]
As reproduced, the equilibrium subsidy increases with i) increasing trade costs;
ii) decreasing horizontal and increasing vertical diﬀerentiation (high ¾ and °);
and iii) decreasing income share, ¹. In general, the calibration reveals that
the equilibrium subsidy is relatively high; a couple of parameters show values
even beyond the maximum tax base, Y P = 1.
In summary, the subsidy race does not promote agglomeration; in fact, it
preserves spatial dispersion. The picture changes if exogenous asymmetry is
included, because the larger country has access to a larger tax base and is able
to ﬁnally exceed the subsidy of the smaller country.
2. For medium trade costs, t 2 T 00, the regional governments orientate at the gen-
eral policy given by equation (44). Similar to the reaction functions (47), the
subsidy in one location should exceed the maximum wage gap plus the increase
of real research wages due to the subsidization of the competing country:





















8 t 2 T
00: (50)
The equilibrium subsidy in this stage is also positive, globally stable, and
increasing in trade costs.
3. For low trade costs, t 2 T 000, the reaction functions become according to (45):
¿1 (¿2;t) = ¿
000 + ¿2t
¹ (51a)
¿2 (¿1;t) = ¿
000 + ¿1t
¹: (51b)
Because the corner solution s = 1 (s = 0) is relevant for location 2 (1), the
slopes of both functions are inverse compared to equations (47). In conse-
quence, a positive equilibrium is not existent, and the subsidy race escalates.
Summarizing the results of a policy competition:
27Result 5.1 For the case of a bilateral R&D subsidy competition, a Nash equilibrium
subsidy exists for high trade costs, but is not realizable due to a high tax burden for
critically high trade costs. As trade costs decrease, the equilibrium subsidy decreases
as well; the symmetric distribution across both locations remains unchanged also
after passing the sustain point. After a critical value, where t 2 T 000, the Nash
equilibrium disappears. In comparison with the laissez-faire outcome, the political
competition preserves industrial dispersion also for trade costs below the sustain
point. However, as soon as the trade costs fall below the domain T 00, the subsidy
race escalates until the maximum viability of the tax base is reached. Even at this
point, the symmetric outcome remains because both countries subsidize local R&D
in the same (maximum) extent.
Herewith, the symmetry perpetuates so that both the break and sustain points lose
their central relevance. In the end, both countries are situated in a regional-political
prisoners’ dilemma. Due to mutual compensation of subsidy eﬀects, both locations
bear an income transfer between production workers and scientists that does not
have an impact either on product quality and private R&D expenditures or on the
spatial distribution of industries.
In the case of exogenous asymmetries, the smaller country has to apply a higher
subsidy for compensating the initial disadvantage. Therewith, its already lower
maximum tax burden is sooner exhausted so that the smaller country ﬁnally loses
the locational competition.
Combining these results with the outcome of Section 4, an answer can be found for
the question, if a locational competition leads to a welfare improvement in contrast
to a centrally planned or cooperative solution:
Result 5.2 For high trade costs t > tH, dispersion implies a Hicksian welfare im-
provement despite unavailing policy eﬀorts, if the net welfare of production workers,
¢W H, is higher than the lump sum tax to be paid for R&D subsidies.
If the trade costs decrease, until agglomeration is socially preferred, the outcome of
the political game allows the following conclusion:
Result 5.3 For low trade costs t < tK, the preservation of symmetry as a result
of an (escalating) political R&D competition precludes not only a welfare improving
agglomeration in the sense of Kaldor, but also burdens the tax paying production
workers at their maximum capacity.
Concerning governmental R&D strategies, the standard trade policy literature fol-
lows the seminal work of Spencer and Brander (1983). In terms of product R&D,
prominent contributions are provided by Zhou et al. (2002), Park (2001), and Jinji
(2003), who consider vertically diﬀerentiating oligopolies. The structure of these
28models basically diﬀers from the underlying paper in trade ﬂows: two ﬁrms in two
countries, either developed and less developed or symmetric, supply the market of
a third country. The authors show that in the unilateral case, a government has
an incentive to subsidize the ﬁrm in the home country. In the bilateral constella-
tion, the optimum policy depends upon which oligopolistic competition, Bertrand
or Cournot, is assumed for the market, the technological endowment, as well as
political objectives. The latter implies the main diﬀerence to policymakers in the
present model. Instead of aﬀecting product quality to maximize local welfare, which
is simply ﬁrm proﬁts minus subsidy, the grant in this paper is used as a migration
incentive aiming to achieve agglomeration within the home country. In spite of the
complexity of model assumptions, especially with respect to the general equilibrium
framework, the implications of the political game derived here are much simpler.
Primarily, this is due to the monopolistic competitive setting of the manufacturing
sector, where ﬁrms lack the opportunity for strategic behavior.
6 Conclusions
Summing up and coming back to the European case, the model results demon-
strate a strong destabilizing impact of R&D and highly skilled migration on the
spatial formation of industries. For an increasing trade integration, the mechanisms
inevitably lead to a total relocation of R&D and the corresponding downstream
sector. As shown in Section 3, larger countries reveal a stronger agglomeration ten-
dency due to a larger market potential and, thus, stronger home market and price
index eﬀects.
Turning to the recent policy eﬀorts, from a unilateral perspective an R&D and in-
novation policy via subsidization is viable to achieve agglomeration in the home
country. In particular, a realization is not inevitably possible due to a limited tax
base, and depending upon the level of trade costs, not a welfare improvement. Fur-
ther on, as the numerical calibrations reveal, outcomes and thus policy implications
are very sensitive to the choice of parameters so that general yes/no recommenda-
tions are not reasonable.
Before the constitution of the Lisbon strategy, each European state has followed
its own R&D policy and still does. Since direct export subsidizations are explicitly
prohibited in the course of the common market, subsidizing R&D is partly used as
indirect promotion of the domestic industry. However, as the non-cooperative pol-
icy game results of this paper show, a conﬂicting subsidy race may lead to a stable
Nash equilibrium for high and medium trade costs, where the equilibrium subsidy
decreases with increasing integration. At a critical level the equilibrium disappears
implying an escalating race. Between similar countries, the policy interventions do
not have an impact at all. The tax-subsidy income transfer is ineﬃcient with respect
to the political objectives. Nonetheless, a unilateral exit would lead to a total relo-
29cation so that both countries are forced to maintain the subsidy competition. For
large diﬀerences in country size, the smaller country has to pay a higher subsidy to
compensate its initial disadvantage. For decreasing trade costs, this country would
ﬁnally lose the R&D race – a result that occurs also for the laissez-faire case.
In summary, these outcomes clearly legitimate a harmonized R&D policy, which
raises the conﬂict between European dispersion and agglomeration.
In spite of European and national political interests, spatial dispersion is not neces-
sarily a Pareto superior state, as shown in Section 4. In the course of a further Euro-
pean integration going along with decreasing trade costs, agglomeration increasingly
tends to be a welfare improvement due to an increasing compensation potential in
the sense of Kaldor. In addition, an agglomeration of research and manufacturing
sectors implies a higher spatial eﬃciency as a result of external economies of scale.
The model demonstrates that in the agglomeration equilibrium, the periphery en-
tirely focuses on the constant return sector, while the production labor force in the
core is mainly employed in the monopolistic competitive sector. On one hand, this
spatial specialization implies a distinguished industrial pattern that is also veriﬁed
for Europe by the much noticed empirical studies of Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000)
and Combes and Overman (2004). On the other hand, this outcome concludes that
primarily low skilled and mature industries tend to relocate towards peripheral coun-
tries. In fact, this restricts the technological potential of these regions but ensures
a division of labor according to comparative advantages and, thus, an increasing
employment in these industries.
Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000) and Combes and Overman (2004) provide a couple
of stylized results relevant for this paper: 1) The location of R&D intensive indus-
tries is increasingly responsive to the local endowments of researchers. 2) High-tech
and increasing returns industries tend to be more spatially concentrated. 3) The
dissimilarities between peripheral and core countries become more and more ob-
vious involving an increasing degree of geographical specialization. Furthermore,
Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002) show that countries with an increasing en-
dowment of high-skilled labor succeed in attracting R&D intensive industries. What
can be concluded from the model results presented in this paper?
The spatial concentration on the national aggregation level can also be continued
on the regional level. Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002) show that on the in-
ternational level the industrial pattern in Europe did not change in a major degree.
In contrast, on the regional level, the trend of increasing concentration has accel-
erated. This development can be traced back to the decreasing relevance of trade
costs the lower the level of spatial aggregation. Combined with a higher regional
labor mobility, this leads to a weakening of dispersive forces and an enhancement
of agglomeration forces between regions. In consequence, growing high-tech clusters
are located in already established metropolitan areas. In the case of biotechnology,
30these are mainly in the direct proximity of London, Munich, and Paris.27
A proceeding integration process, especially in terms of the common market, and
a further liberalization of national labor markets remove still persisting mobility
barriers for workers also with respect to the Eastern European acceding countries,
which exhibit a considerably westward brain drain tendency.28 All in all, an increas-
ing importance of R&D intensive industries and highly-skilled migration will foster
industrial disparities across the EU on a national, as well as on a regional, level.
Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002) ﬁnd that two scenarios might be possible
for the European future depending upon the degree of factor mobility and agglom-
eration gains. The authors state that at low labor and high capital mobility, as well
as small agglomeration gains, a possible outcome is specialization. Furthermore,
the study ﬁnds evidence for strong agglomeration forces within rather than across
industries implying "industry black holes," which connotes agglomeration for partic-
ular industries. Between those possibilities, the model supports the latter. Although
low-skilled migration is relatively low in Europe, the mobility of high-skilled workers,
especially of scientists, is higher and increasing.29 Although the home market eﬀect
due to high skilled migration is presumably low, the migration eﬀect is strengthened
by the accompanying gain of R&D advantages.
In consequence, industry black hole agglomeration will occur primarily for R&D
intensive industries and this most likely in the European core. Since the welfare
implications argue for agglomeration rather than dispersion at increasing trade in-
tegration, not only a geographical specialization in terms of vertically linked sectors
has to be promoted, but also in terms of R&D intensity. To put the policy im-
plication more strikingly, the model combined with the empirical results suggest a
European structural policy that promotes high-tech industries within the core, and
low- and medium-tech within the periphery.
7 Technical Appendix
Symmetric Equilibrium
Because the equation system is symmetric in terms of location, there exists a sym-
metric equilibrium, which can be determined by simply dropping the subscripts and





27See, e.g., Allansdottir et al. (2000).
28See, e.g., Straubhaar (2000).
29This aspect is also part of the EU program European Research Area (ERA). See "Second
Implementation Report on A Mobility Strategy for the European Research Area", Commission
Staﬀ Working Paper, SEC(2004) 412.





























Assuming that the whole R&D sector is totally agglomerated in location 1, so that
s = 1 and ¸2 = 0 (analogously, for the inverse relation: s = 0 and ¸1 = 0 ), we















































32¹ r2 = ¹ r1
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Sustain and Break Points
Considering the agglomeration equilibrium, the sustain point occurs at the zero-
diﬀerential: ¹ ½1 ¡ ¹ ½2 = 0. Using equation (60b), this expression can be rearranged
to: ¹ r1 = ¹ r2t¡¹. Substituting (61b) yields equation (27) for the sustain point, ﬁnally.
For the break point, we determine the trade costs level, where the slope of the
symmetric wage diﬀerential with respect to s becomes zero. Totally diﬀerentiating




















From substitution of equations (23) and (26) in (62) and solving for Z, we obtain:
Z =
1 ¡ t1¡¾
1 + t1¡¾ =
¹° (2¾ ¡ 1)(¾° ¡ ¹)
°3¾2 (¾ ¡ 1) ¡ ¹[¹(¹ ¡ ¾°) ¡ °2¾ (1 ¡ ¾)]
: (63)
Solving for trade costs, equation (63) becomes (28).
No-Black-Hole Condition
The validity of the no-black-hole condition can be seen at the requirement for a
positive nominator of equation (28). The condition implies that both break and
sustain points occur for t > 1. This restriction can also be derived by following
the approach of Fujita et al. (1999). Starting from the total diﬀerential of the real



















d¸ ¡ 2ds: (65)
By substitution of equations (23) and (65) in (64) and considering the case of in-








(1 ¡ ¾)° ¡ ¹(° ¡ 1)




¹ ¡ ° (¾ ¡ 1)
° (¾ ¡ 1)
¸
ds: (66)
The sign of the partial derivative with respect to s in equation (66) provides infor-
mation about the slope of the wage gap function plotted in Figure 3. Considering
33the upper limit of the trade costs domain, that is Z = 1, a negative slope of the
wage diﬀerential in the symmetric equilibrium ensures that the break point must
occur for smaller, non-inﬁnite values of trade costs. Therefore, the nominator of the
derivative must be negative, which ﬁnally requires: ¹ < ° (¾ ¡ 1).
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Figure 3: Wiggle Diagrams for Real Research Wage Diﬀerentials (Parameter values:



















Figure 4: Bifurcation Diagram for Asymmetric Locations
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Figure 9: Equilibrium Subsidy in the Symmetric Policy Game (Parameter values: ¾ = 2,
° = 2, ¹ = 0:4, t = 3)
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Table 1: Sustain Points and Exogenous Asymmetry
σ=3 γ=5 µ=0.2 a=1.05
1.17742 1.17742 1.34005 1.77314
1.18858 1.18858 1.36595 1.94493
σ=5 γ=7 µ=0.6 a=1.1
1.04363 1.04363 2.60595 1.69751
1.04865 1.04865 2.65618 2.03358
σ=7 γ=9 µ=0.8 a=1.2
1.01922 1.01922 3.91321 1.56598
1.02252 1.02252 3.99228 2.21218
Reference case: σ=2; γ=2 ; µ=0.4; a=1.01
Table 2: Welfare and Critical Thresholds
σ=3 γ=5 µ=0.2
t
K 1.11781 1.12116 1.18162
t
B 1.18187 1.27174 1.35088
t
S 1.18298 1.27272 1.35293
t
H 1.18220 1.30652 1.28480
σ=5 γ=7 µ=0.6
t
K 1.03707 1.08509 1.45980
t
B 1.04606 1.18717 2.51261
t
S 1.04613 1.18747 2.63092
t
H 1.04551 1.21013 5.16952
σ=7 γ=9 µ=0.8
t
K 1.01803 1.06557 1.56972
t
B 1.02087 1.14271 3.50000
t
S 1.02252 1.14286 3.95249
t
H 1.02063 1.15982 -
Reference case: σ=2; γ=2 ; µ=0.4
43Table 3: Comparative Statics of Nash Equilibrium Subsidies
t σ=3 γ=5 µ=0.2
1.1 - - -
1.5 0.389748 0.096908 0.055371
2.0 >1 0.360763 0.227559
3.0 >1 >1 0.56299
t σ=5 γ=7 µ=0.4
1.1 0.172341 - -
1.5 >1 0.148586 -
2.0 >1 0.534878 0.042508
3.0 >1 >1 0.32186
t σ=7 γ=9 µ=0.6
1.1 0.432046 - -
1.5 >1 0.187506 -
2.0 >1 0.751615 -
3.0 >1 >1 0.08242
Reference case: σ=2; γ=2 ; µ=0.4
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